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New York Times
October 27, 2004

Discord On North Korea As Powell Finishes East Asia Trip

By Steven R. Weisman

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 26 - A trip to East Asia by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell aimed at forging a united front on North Korea ended Tuesday on a discordant note, with Mr. Powell rebuffing a suggestion by China and South Korea that they all show greater flexibility in pressing for an end to the North's nuclear program.

The disagreement appeared to reinforce the diplomatic impasse over North Korea's nuclear activities and to make it unlikely that the North would end its boycott of regional talks on the issue anytime soon.

Standing by Mr. Powell at a news conference, the South Korean foreign minister, Ban Ki Moon, said in response to a question that the United States and other partners in talks on nuclear issues "must come up with a more creative and realistic proposal so that North Korea can come to the negotiating table as soon as possible."

Earlier, the official New Chinese News Agency released a similar comment from China's foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing.

"We wish the U.S. side would go further to adopt a flexible and practical attitude on the issue," the press agency quoted Mr. Li as telling Mr. Powell during a meeting in Beijing on Monday. "China will make efforts to push for a new round of six-party talks at the earliest date in a bid to carry on the hard-earned peaceful discussion process." There was some confusion over Mr. Ban's remarks, because the English translation omitted his statement questioning the American approach. Afterward, South Korean journalists said the interpreter had left out the call for a more "creative and realistic" approach.

Mr. Powell appeared not to be aware of Mr. Ban's challenge, but he was clear in rejecting any suggestion that the United States modify its current stance along lines sought by North Korea.

"We have a good proposal on the table," Mr. Powell said, displaying some impatience. "We modified it for the third round of talks in June. The way to move forward is to have the next round of six-party talks and not have a negotiation with ourselves at press conferences."

Mr. Powell said his visit had yielded commitments from China, Japan and South Korea to step up pressure on North Korea to restart the talks. "Let's get going," he added. "We hope that in the very near future the North Koreans will see it is in their interest to have the talks start again."

After his meeting here, Mr. Powell headed back to Washington after spending a day each in Japan, China and South Korea.

The disagreement over how to deal with North Korea coincided with reports in the South of possible infiltration by the North through the heavily armed border area. South Korean papers headlined what defense officials said was a search for possible terrorists or spies.

The Powell trip was the latest instance of problems addressing the crisis that began with the disclosure two years ago that North Korea had secretly been enriching uranium, apparently for a nuclear weapons program, in violation of a 1994 accord with the Clinton administration.

The Bush administration has not only disagreed on occasion with other countries on whether to engage in talks with North Korea and how many concessions to offer, but top administration officials are also divided. Some conservatives in Congress, fearing too many concessions, are calling for a strategy of "regime change."

This month Congress passed and President Bush signed into law a resolution insisting that progress on human rights be a part of any deal with North Korea. Some moderates in the administration and many in Asia fear that such an approach might derail the talks.

The administration has adopted a tough stance on concessions, but in response to demands for negotiations has enlisted China, Russia, South Korea and Japan in confronting the North. The diplomacy has not yielded much progress.

In June, the Bush administration yielded to pressure from some of its Asian partners and agreed to let Japan and South Korea - but not the United States - offer the North a package of energy and economic aid if the North committed itself to ending its nuclear program in a verifiable way.

But last week, North Korea demanded that the United States take part in the aid package as a condition for its returning to the negotiations. Mr. Powell said North Korea should first return to the talks, where the demand could be discussed.

The impasse is not likely to be broken soon, many experts say, at least until the American presidential election is over. Meanwhile, suspicions are growing in the West that North Korea may be moving steadily to amass enough nuclear material for at least two and perhaps as many as six or eight bombs.

In a sign of disagreement over the role of human rights as requested in the Congressional resolution, Foreign Minister Ban of South Korea said that although human rights should be honored everywhere, caution might be in order for North Korea.

He said "the particular situation" of North Korea's government "has to be taken into account when we deal with these kinds of issues" and that "this matter should not have a negative effect" on the negotiations.

Su Hyun Lee contributed reporting for this article.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/27/international/27diplo.html?oref=login>

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Washington Times

October 27, 2004

Pg. 13

Group Discloses Secret Nuke Effort

Also says facility near completion

By Jennifer Joan Lee, The Washington Times

PARIS — The Iranian opposition group that exposed the nation's covert nuclear weapons program two years ago said yesterday that supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ordered the effort to continue in secret. The opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), also disclosed the existence of what it said is a new uranium enrichment facility in central Iran that is nearing completion. Speaking to reporters in Paris yesterday, Mohammad Mohaddessin, chairman of the NCRI's Foreign Affairs Committee, said the Iranian regime is "playing a double game" with Europe. "Khamenei has ordered his regime to not only continue the enrichment of uranium, but to buy time and accelerate the project in order to make the bomb as quickly as possible," Mr. Mohaddessin said. "Khamenei has ordered his diplomats and his negotiators to prolong the negotiations as much as possible, possibly by between eight and 12 months, which is exactly the time needed to complete the bomb," he said. The Bush administration and European powers have branded the NCRI a terrorist group, mainly because its military wing was sheltered by Saddam Hussein at bases in Iraq, from which it launched attacks in Iran. The group, however, gained credibility in August 2002 by exposing another secret uranium enrichment facility being built underground in Natanz, 150 miles south of Tehran, and a heavy water production facility at Arak, about 120 miles southwest of Tehran. That exposure triggered the current nuclear standoff with Iran, by forcing the Islamist regime to open these sites to the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Talks today between European negotiators and Iran represent a "last-chance" at getting the Tehran regime to stop enriching uranium and avoid the threat of U.N. sanctions. In exchange, the Europeans are offering technical assistance — such as helping Iran build a light-water power reactor and providing a supply of reactor fuel — and trade incentives. Mr. Mohaddessin said that while the regime was negotiating with Europe, it was also putting the finishing touches on a major site that would be needed to produce large quantities of enriched uranium. The site, located in Isfahan in central Iran, would convert uranium oxide, called "yellowcake," into uranium hexafluoride gas, a stage prior to enrichment. He said a test center for centrifuges had been constructed with "utmost discretion" near the site, and that between 120 and 180 centrifuges will be installed there. Uranium hexafluoride is fed into centrifuges for enrichment. Mr. Mohaddessin credited a network of sources inside Iran for his information. A spokesman at the British Foreign Office, reached by telephone, declined to comment on Mr. Mohaddessin's charges but said there was "nothing to lose" by continuing to negotiate. "If we do get compliance, that's all well and good, and if we don't, there's more chance of a consensus at the next [IAEA] board meeting because all options would have been looked at," he said.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20041026-100139-5203r.htm>

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Baltimore Sun
October 27, 2004

Israel Sees Nuclear Threat From Iran As Near Critical Stage

Decades after destroying Iraqi reactor, Israelis say Iran is larger problem

By Peter Hermann, Sun Foreign Staff

JERUSALEM - Two decades after Israeli warplanes destroyed an Iraqi reactor in a daring attack to prevent Saddam Hussein from producing atomic weapons, Israeli officials believe they may face a larger nuclear threat from Iran. "The threat perceived by Israeli officials is considered to be serious, and to be growing to a critical stage," said Gerald Steinberg, an associate professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University in Tel Aviv and a specialist in Middle East arms control.

Experts warn that if Tehran's uranium enrichment program leads to the production of nuclear weapons, Iran will have upset the balance of power in the region, and possibly force Israel to abandon its policy of nuclear ambiguity and acknowledge its own weapons stockpile.

"The international community has a huge stake in Iran not going nuclear," said Geoffrey Kemp, director of regional strategic programs for the Nixon Center in Washington. If Iran does not alter its policies, it "will soon reach a point of no return. Irrespective of what they say the uranium is for, they will eventually be able to build the bomb."

Iranian officials have denied that they are developing nuclear weapons and have vowed to continue the enrichment program that they say is essential for generating electricity.

But there is broad agreement among the international community that Iran's enrichment program involves far more uranium than is needed to fuel electrical plants.

Israeli officials and others studying weapons proliferation in the Middle East say the time to act is now.

"One doesn't want Iran, which is a terror-sponsoring state, to have nuclear weapons," said a senior Israeli army officer who spoke on condition of anonymity. "It will strategically change the balance of power in favor of the axis of terror. One cannot help but relate differently or with more caution or with more restraint to a country that has the threat of nuclear weapons behind it. It will give terror a free hand."

In August, Iran threatened to destroy Israel's nuclear facilities, prompting a terse response from the Israeli government that Israel "knows how to defend itself." Iran's deputy defense minister, Ali Shamkhani, responded, "We will not sit to wait for others to do something to us."

In September, Iran tested a new surface-to-surface missile, the Shihab 3, with a reported range of 1,200 miles. If the weapon's capabilities are as described by Iran - Israeli experts doubt its range and accuracy - the missile could reach Tel Aviv.

Israeli officials say they are content to await action from the international community. But Maj. Gen. Dan Halutz, the army's deputy chief of staff, told the newspaper Yediot Ahronot that they would wait only "until we reach the point in which we shall have to rely on ourselves."

In February, Israel received the first of more than 100 U.S.-built F-16I aircraft that military observers say are equipped with extra fuel tanks. In June, Israel bought nearly 5,000 U.S.-made smart bombs, including 500 so-called "bunker busters" capable of destroying 6-foot-thick concrete walls buried underground.

Army officials say the purchases and the tensions with Iran are coincidental.

"The arms transfer process between the U.S. and Israel is a long and bureaucratic procedure," Steinberg said. "We are probably reading too much into this to say that it is a direct response to the current tension over Iran. But I think it would be accurate to see the strengthening of Israel's qualitative edge as consistent with the increased threats."

The Israeli military is not ruling out bombing Iran's nuclear centers.

"The important point is to prevent the present regime from reaching a nuclear option," Israel's army chief of staff, Shaul Mofaz, said last month. "All options for preventing this will be considered."

But destroying Iran's nuclear facilities would be far more difficult than the operation in Iraq in 1981 that destroyed its French-built Osirak reactor. Iran's nuclear program is spread over several sites, some deeply buried, and an attacker would face Iranian forces capable of launching a counterattack.

"It is highly unlikely that Israel would do a military strike," said Kemp. "I don't think that the Israelis would want to be a leader in this. Their argument is that this is a problem not just for Israel but for the rest of the world."

Kemp said Iranian officials know Israel's capabilities. "They know what weapons Israel has, and they know if they do anything horrendous they would get hit 10 times over."

An analyst who advises the Israeli government described Iran's actions as "splendid brinkmanship" and said he saw no need for immediate military action. But he warned that not referring the issue to the United Nations Security Council on Nov. 25 would "allow [Iran] to think that they can continue this brinkmanship without paying any price." Shai Feldman, director of Israel's Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, said Iranian leaders are "terrified that people are out to get them, especially the Bush administration," and that they had seen that North Korea had not been punished after saying that it has nuclear weapons.

"If I were an Iranian defense planner, I would rather be North Korea than the state of Iraq," Feldman said. "That's a pretty strong incentive for developing a nuclear weapon. It's a strategic imperative to be in a situation where you have the insurance policy that the North Korean regime enjoys."

<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-te.israel27oct27.1.3127625.story>

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Christian Science Monitor

October 27, 2004

Pakistan's Disturbing Nuclear Trail

Materials from A.Q. Khan's black-market nuclear network remain unaccounted for.

By Faye Bowers, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON – It's been a year since US and British agents boarded a German ship in the Mediterranean Sea that led to the exposure of the unimaginable: a vast black-market nuclear arms bazaar operating under superpower radar for more than a decade.

Today, investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and some 20 countries working together have uncovered many parts of the clandestine network run by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan. Just in the past month, three more people who allegedly acted as middlemen were arrested in South Africa.

The records confiscated from these men's companies, together with other confiscated documents and information from Dr. Khan and his top aides, have led to the virtual shutdown of the clandestine network.

But government officials and experts say that in today's world, where both major presidential candidates say nuclear proliferation is the nation's most critical security threat, much more needs to be done.

"Overall, the Khan network is the biggest nonproliferation disaster of the nuclear age," says Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. "It is certainly good news that at least the beginning of breaking up that network has occurred. Unfortunately, a substantial number of players in that network are still walking around free people."

Those walking free are probably additional businessmen, still unidentified, with specific technical capabilities to manufacture parts for centrifuges, the machines used to enrich uranium, a necessary ingredient for a nuclear bomb. Moreover, Dr. Khan and his top aides remain free, or at least semi-free. Although Khan publicly admitted his guilt this past February, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf pardoned him. Khan is said to be under house arrest in five costly mansions. His top aides are free as well, their movements apparently monitored.

Neither US nor IAEA investigators have been given access to Khan and his aides - a huge problem, investigators say, because they need to know if other countries besides Libya, North Korea, and Iran were offered Khan's plans and/or technology. For example, investigators in Iraq found records indicating that before the 1991 Gulf War, Khan offered Saddam Hussein, through a middleman, the same blueprints that he provided Libya.

Pakistani officials have interviewed Khan and his aides, and have "provided some information," says a Western diplomat close to the IAEA. "But they could provide much more."

Far more useful, say experts familiar with the network, have been documents confiscated in the raids on the various companies tied to the network - in Germany, Switzerland, Turkey, Malaysia, Dubai, and South Africa.

The IAEA, the nuclear watchdog arm of the United Nations, has no leverage on Pakistani officials. The United States is widely seen as the only country with the clout to pressure Pakistan.

But Washington walks a fine line with Islamabad: It must avoid alienating the country, since it's crucial to the US war on terror. At the same time, however, by backing the Musharraf regime too much, the US could inflame Islamic radicals in the country, leading to the government's overthrow. Relations between the two nations are tenuous.

Still, on balance, many experts think the US could do more to persuade Pakistan to let IAEA investigators interview Khan. "For the US to leverage Musharraf so the IAEA could talk to Khan, how does that destabilize Pakistan?" asks David Albright, president of the Institute of Science and International Security in Washington.

US government officials, for their part, won't talk about how much information Musharraf has handed over, nor how much pressure they are applying. A CIA official said the State Department is the government's focal point for tracking the network. Secretary of State Colin Powell has only said he's speaking with Musharraf, who is cooperating.

Still, investigators and officials are concerned that Khan's plans and technology may have been passed to other unknown people or countries.

One top concern: Critical parts for the centrifuge remain unaccounted for, even though individuals and companies in some 30 countries have been apprehended and searched, IAEA officials say. That suggests that other companies or people, still not caught, may be able to produce the missing parts.

"There's no sense that all the information this network possessed - gas centrifuge or nuclear weapons design or fabrication - has been recovered," says Dr. Albright. "It's still out there and could be offered to others."

"The most disturbing sign found in Libya was the bomb blueprints," says the Western diplomat close to the IAEA.

"Is there some hard disk somewhere that has all these designs and where are they?"

Melissa Fleming, an IAEA spokeswoman, says an intensive probe is under way. "We need to determine who all the players were, what was involved, who the customers were, and to what extent it has now been busted or contained."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1027/p03s01-usgn.html>

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Washington Post

NRC Closes Web Library for Security Review

Associated Press

Wednesday, October 27, 2004; Page A23

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has closed public access to its online document library, pending a review to determine what potentially sensitive documents should be removed because they might be useful to terrorists, the agency said yesterday.

"Agency guidelines provide that any information that could be useful, or could reasonably be expected to be useful, to a terrorist in a potential attack should be withheld," the NRC said in a statement.

The action came after a report by NBC that the agency's Web site included detailed information on the location of radioactive substances, generally used in medicine and for industrial purposes, that could be used to prepare a "dirty bomb."

In some cases, the data included diagrams that pinpointed the location of the material in hospitals and other facilities, according to the NBC report.

As part of the review, the NRC said it temporarily closed public access to its online document library, its electronic hearing docket files and NRC staff documents related to NRC consideration of a high-level nuclear waste repository. "This action, when completed, is intended to ensure that documents which might provide assistance to terrorists will be inaccessible while maintaining public access to information regarding NRC activities," the agency said.

After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, more than 1,000 documents were removed from the NRC Web site. Additional documents disappeared in subsequent reviews.

While the Web site does not contain classified material, the NRC "is widening its review to remove additional information that could potentially be of use to a terrorist," the agency said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A455-2004Oct26.html>

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Washington Times

October 28, 2004

Pg. 1

Russia Tied To Iraq's Missing Arms

Pentagon: Weaponry relocated before war

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

Russian special forces troops moved many of Saddam Hussein's weapons and related goods out of Iraq and into Syria in the weeks before the March 2003 U.S. military operation, The Washington Times has learned.

John A. Shaw, the deputy undersecretary of defense for international technology security, said in an interview that he believes the Russian troops, working with Iraqi intelligence, "almost certainly" removed the high-explosive material that went missing from the Al-Qaqaa facility, south of Baghdad.

"The Russians brought in, just before the war got started, a whole series of military units," Mr. Shaw said. "Their main job was to shred all evidence of any of the contractual arrangements they had with the Iraqis. The others were transportation units."

Mr. Shaw, who was in charge of cataloging the tons of conventional arms provided to Iraq by foreign suppliers, said he recently obtained reliable information on the arms-dispersal program from two European intelligence services that have detailed knowledge of the Russian-Iraqi weapons collaboration.

Most of Saddam's most powerful arms were systematically separated from other arms like mortars, bombs and rockets, and sent to Syria and Lebanon, and possibly to Iran, he said.

The Russian involvement in helping disperse Saddam's weapons, including some 380 tons of RDX and HMX, is still being investigated, Mr. Shaw said.

The RDX and HMX, which are used to manufacture high-explosive and nuclear weapons, are probably of Russian origin, he said.

Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita could not be reached for comment.

The disappearance of the material was reported in a letter Oct. 10 from the Iraqi government to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Disclosure of the missing explosives Monday in a New York Times story was used by the Democratic presidential campaign of Sen. John Kerry, who accused the Bush administration of failing to secure the material.

Al-Qaqaa, a known Iraqi weapons site, was monitored closely, Mr. Shaw said.

"That was such a pivotal location, Number 1, that the mere fact of [special explosives] disappearing was impossible," Mr. Shaw said. "And Number 2, if the stuff disappeared, it had to have gone before we got there."

The Pentagon disclosed yesterday that the Al-Qaqaa facility was defended by Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard and other Iraqi military units during the conflict. U.S. forces defeated the defenders around April 3 and found the gates to the facility open, the Pentagon said in a statement yesterday.

A military unit in charge of searching for weapons, the Army's 75th Exploitation Task Force, then inspected Al-Qaqaa on May 8, May 11 and May 27, 2003, and found no high explosives that had been monitored in the past by the IAEA.

The Pentagon said there was no evidence of large-scale movement of explosives from the facility after April 6.

"The movement of 377 tons of heavy ordnance would have required dozens of heavy trucks and equipment moving along the same roadways as U.S. combat divisions occupied continually for weeks prior to and subsequent to the 3rd Infantry Division's arrival at the facility," the statement said.

The statement also said that the material may have been removed from the site by Saddam's regime.

According to the Pentagon, U.N. arms inspectors sealed the explosives at Al-Qaqaa in January 2003 and revisited the site in March and noted that the seals were not broken.

It is not known whether the inspectors saw the explosives in March. The U.N. team left the country before the U.S.-led invasion began March 20, 2003.

A second defense official said documents on the Russian support to Iraq reveal that Saddam's government paid the Kremlin for the special forces to provide security for Iraq's Russian arms and to conduct counterintelligence activities designed to prevent U.S. and Western intelligence services from learning about the arms pipeline through Syria.

The Russian arms-removal program was initiated after Yevgeny Primakov, the former Russian intelligence chief, could not persuade Saddam to give in to U.S. and Western demands, this official said.

A small portion of Iraq's 650,000 tons to 1 million tons of conventional arms that were found after the war were looted after the U.S.-led invasion, Mr. Shaw said. Russia was Iraq's largest foreign supplier of weaponry, he said. However, the most important and useful arms and explosives appear to have been separated and moved out as part of carefully designed program. "The organized effort was done in advance of the conflict," Mr. Shaw said.

The Russian forces were tasked with moving special arms out of the country.

Mr. Shaw said foreign intelligence officials believe the Russians worked with Saddam's Mukhabarat intelligence service to separate out special weapons, including high explosives and other arms and related technology, from standard conventional arms spread out in some 200 arms depots.

The Russian weapons were then sent out of the country to Syria, and possibly Lebanon in Russian trucks, Mr. Shaw said.

Mr. Shaw said he believes that the withdrawal of Russian-made weapons and explosives from Iraq was part of plan by Saddam to set up a "redoubt" in Syria that could be used as a base for launching pro-Saddam insurgency operations in Iraq.

The Russian units were dispatched beginning in January 2003 and by March had destroyed hundreds of pages of documents on Russian arms supplies to Iraq while dispersing arms to Syria, the second official said.

Besides their own weapons, the Russians were supplying Saddam with arms made in Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria and other Eastern European nations, he said.

"Whatever was not buried was put on lorries and sent to the Syrian border," the defense official said.

Documents reviewed by the official included itineraries of military units involved in the truck shipments to Syria.

The materials outlined in the documents included missile components, MiG jet parts, tank parts and chemicals used to make chemical weapons, the official said.

The director of the Iraqi government front company known as the Al Bashair Trading Co. fled to Syria, where he is in charge of monitoring arms holdings and funding Iraqi insurgent activities, the official said.

Also, an Arabic-language report obtained by U.S. intelligence disclosed the extent of Russian armaments. The 26-page report was written by Abdul Tawab Mullah al Huwaysh, Saddam's minister of military industrialization, who was captured by U.S. forces May 2, 2003.

The Russian "spetsnaz" or special-operations forces were under the GRU military intelligence service and organized large commercial truck convoys for the weapons removal, the official said.

Regarding the explosives, the new Iraqi government reported that 194.7 metric tons of HMX, or high-melting-point explosive, and 141.2 metric tons of RDX, or rapid-detonation explosive, and 5.8 metric tons of PETN, or pentaerythritol tetranitrate, were missing.

The material is used in nuclear weapons and also in making military "plastic" high explosive.

Defense officials said the Russians can provide information on what happened to the Iraqi weapons and explosives that were transported out of the country. Officials believe the Russians also can explain what happened to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20041028-122637-6257r.htm>

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Washington Post

October 28, 2004

Pg. 1

U.S. Barred From Forcing Troops To Get Anthrax Shots

By Marc Kaufman, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Defense Department must immediately stop inoculating troops with anthrax vaccine, a federal judge ruled yesterday, saying that the Food and Drug Administration acted improperly when it approved the experimental injections for general use.

Concluding that the FDA violated its own rules by approving the vaccine late last year, U.S. District Court Judge Emmet G. Sullivan said the mandatory vaccination program -- which has inoculated more than 1.2 million troops since 1998 -- is "illegal."

Sullivan said that his ban on involuntary vaccination will remain in place until the FDA reviews the anthrax vaccine properly or until President Bush determines that the normal process must be waived because of emergency circumstances.

The Defense Department has required many troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan to be vaccinated, and it has punished and sometimes court-martialed those who refused. The Pentagon expanded its anthrax and smallpox vaccination programs in July to include troops stationed in South Korea and other areas in Asia and Africa, despite complaints from some service members that the anthrax vaccine made them sick.

In a statement, the Defense Department said it is reviewing the decision and will "pause giving anthrax vaccinations until the legal situation is clarified. . . . DoD remains convinced that the anthrax immunization program complies with all the legal requirements and that the anthrax vaccine is safe and effective."

In his ruling, Sullivan said that the FDA's approval was invalid because it did not meet the required review standards and the agency failed to seek the necessary public comment.

"Congress has prohibited the administration of investigational drugs to service members without their consent," Sullivan said. "This Court will not permit the government to circumvent this requirement."

"The men and women of our armed forces deserve the assurance that the vaccines our government compels them to take into their bodies have been tested by the greatest scrutiny of all -- public scrutiny. This is the process the FDA in its expert judgment has outlined, and this is the course this court shall compel FDA to follow," Sullivan wrote. The judge ruled on a suit filed in March 2003 by six service members and civilians who argued that the FDA never properly reviewed the vaccine's ability to protect against inhalation anthrax. The suit contended that the drug was never shown to be effective, and that some vaccinated troops experienced extreme fatigue, joint pain and temporary memory loss after being vaccinated. The vaccine, made by BioPort Corp. of Lansing, Mich., is given in a series of shots.

Mark Zaid, an attorney for the six who has also defended more than a dozen service members court-martialed for refusing the vaccination, said one of his clients is a breast-feeding mother who does not think the vaccine is safe for her child.

"We will now initiate an effort to ensure the government reverses all punishments that were imposed for refusing an order to take the vaccine," Zaid said. He said he will also seek compensation for service members who contend they were harmed. "As we've seen in Iraq, there wasn't any actual threat from anthrax, so there was never any real need for the vaccine," Zaid said.

Sullivan initially ruled in late 2003 that the FDA had never approved the vaccine and ordered that the inoculations be stopped. Eight days later, the FDA approved the vaccine based on an application made 18 years earlier, and the inoculation program was resumed. Yesterday's ruling concluded that the agency did not follow its own rules in declaring the vaccine safe and effective.

In particular, Sullivan criticized the FDA for not allowing the public to comment on its decision -- a prerequisite for any approval. There was some public comment when the approval was first sought in 1986, but the 2003 decision was based on research conducted later and never subjected to public comment.

The FDA argued that comments had been submitted as part of a 2001 citizens' petition questioning proposals to begin the vaccinations, but Sullivan found them insufficient. "It is clear to this Court that if the status of the anthrax vaccine were open for public comment today, the agency would receive a deluge of comments and analysis that might inform an open-minded agency," he wrote.

Because the anthrax agent is so deadly, it has been difficult to test a vaccine that might protect against it. The best data have come from a study in the 1950s of workers at a factory that processed animal hides and furs, which can transmit naturally occurring anthrax. That study found that the vaccine now used by the military was effective in reducing the incidence of anthrax spread by contact, but the research involved only a tiny sample of people who might have inhaled the bacteria.

Anthrax vaccine was used in a limited way in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. A more expansive effort began in 1998. Difficulties in manufacturing the vaccine stopped the program in 2000 and 2001, but the vaccination effort was resumed and greatly expanded in 2002.

Staff writer Bradley Graham and researcher Madonna Lebling contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3691-2004Oct27.html>

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Philadelphia Inquirer

October 28, 2004

India Test-Fires Missile With Nuclear Capability

India yesterday tested a nuclear-capable missile with a range of up to 180 miles, an Indian news agency reported. The Prithvi missile was fired from a test range in Chandipur, in the eastern state of Orissa, Press Trust of India reported, quoting unidentified officials in the Defense Research and Development Organization. In Pakistan, Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan said New Delhi had informed them before conducting the missile test. - AP

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/10034116.htm>

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Philadelphia Inquirer

October 28, 2004

Iran Unveils Its Disputed Heavy-Water Plant

During a tour for journalists, officials said there were no plans to suspend the nuclear program.

By Saeed Kousha and Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Inquirer Foreign Staff

ARAK, Iran - Iranian officials unveiled their disputed heavy-water plant 40 miles south of here yesterday, signaling that Iran has no plans to suspend its nuclear program despite calls from the United States to do so.

Leading a small group of journalists on the first-ever public tour of the facility, the plant's deputy director for research and development said that if the West won't provide Iran with nuclear technology, Iranians would provide it themselves. He said the United States and Europe had no reason to be concerned about the plant.

"They are 100 percent wrong" in their concern about Iran's development of the ability to manufacture heavy water, said Manouchehr Madadi. "It is only for research," he said.

So-called heavy water, which contains a heavier hydrogen particle than regular water, will allow Iran to run other nuclear reactors with the natural uranium it mines, rather than requiring enriched uranium, which is far more expensive and difficult to produce, Madadi said.

But heavy water also can be used to develop material for nuclear weapons. It is that possibility that has alarmed the Bush administration, which has demanded that the site be shut down and Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment be halted.

Britain, Germany and France, trying to avert a showdown next month between Iran and the United States before the U.N. Security Council, have offered to provide Iran with nuclear fuel and a light-water research reactor that cannot be used to develop nuclear weapons if Iran agrees to cease activities like those at Arak.

Iranian officials told the European negotiators in Vienna yesterday that they wouldn't suspend work on their nuclear program. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, threatened on Iranian television to pull out of the talks if the West failed to soften its stance.

"If there is any form of threat in the talks... the great Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic of Iran will reconsider the very basis of negotiations and cooperation," he said, according to state-run television in Tehran.

There were no signs of surrender at the plant, which was guarded by antiaircraft batteries and bore at its entrance a sign: "Distillation Workshop."

Showing off the maze of pipes, cranes and scaffolding that took 10 years to build, Madadi said the plant currently produces eight tons of heavy water a year. Within five months, he said, it is expected to double its output. He said the plant's output would be used only for peaceful purposes.

The facility remains a question for the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna-based U.N. watchdog scrutinizing Iran's activities, whose inspectors have toured it twice.

Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, said this week that Iran might be willing to consider a temporary suspension of enrichment. But he cautioned, "No other country can stop us exploring technology which is the legal right of Iran."

European negotiators have warned that most European states will back Washington's call to take the matter before the Security Council for possible economic sanctions if Tehran doesn't give up all uranium enrichment activities before the Nov. 25 IAEA meeting.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/10034121.htm>

Washington Times

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Pg. 1

Photos Point To Removal Of Weapons

Show truck convoys in Iraq before U.S. invasion

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

U.S. intelligence agencies have obtained satellite photographs of truck convoys that were at several weapons sites in Iraq in the weeks before U.S. military operations were launched, defense officials said yesterday.

The photographs indicate that Iraq was moving arms and equipment from its known weapons sites, said officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

According to one official, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, known as NGA, "documented the movement of long convoys of trucks from various areas around Baghdad to the Syrian border."

The official said the convoys are believed to include shipments of sensitive armaments, including equipment used in making plastic explosives and nuclear weapons.

About 380 tons of RDX and HMX, used in making such arms, were reported missing from the Al-Qaqaa weapons facility, though the Pentagon and an embedded NBC News correspondent said the facility appeared to have been emptied by the time U.S. forces got there.

The photographs bolster the claims of Pentagon official John A. Shaw, who told The Washington Times on Wednesday that recent intelligence reports indicate Russian special forces units took part in a sophisticated dispersal operation from January 2003 to March 2003 to move key weapons out of Iraq.

In Moscow, the Russian government denied that its forces were involved in removing weapons from Iraq, dismissing the claims as "far-fetched and ridiculous."

"I can state officially that the Russian Defense Ministry and its structural divisions could not have been involved in the disappearance of the explosives, because Russian servicemen were not in Iraq long before the beginning of the American-British operation in that country," Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Vyacheslav Sedov told Interfax news agency.

Bush administration officials reacted cautiously to information provided by Mr. Shaw, who said details of the Russian "spetsnaz" forces' involvement in a program of document-shredding and weapons dispersal came from two European intelligence services.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters aboard Air Force One that he was unaware of the information in The Times report.

"I know that there is some new information that has come to light in the last couple of days," Mr. McClellan said, noting that another news report said the amount of high-explosive materials may have been less than 377 tons, as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) claims.

Asked about foreign intelligence reports of Russian troops moving Iraq's weapons to Syria, Mr. McClellan said, "I have no information that points in that direction."

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said in a interview on the Laura Ingraham radio show that she also was not aware of the information about Russian troops relocating Saddam's weapons to Syria, Lebanon and possibly Iran.

Defense officials said the information has been closely held within the Pentagon because Mr. Shaw, a deputy undersecretary of defense of international technology security, has been working with the Pentagon inspector general in investigating the Russian role in the weapons transfers.

Information in the inspector general office is not widely shared within the policy and intelligence communities.

The Pentagon is still investigating the fate of the explosives and possible Russian involvement.

Officials said numerous intelligence reports in the past two years indicate Saddam used trucks and aircraft to withdraw weapons from Iraq before March 2003. However, the new information indicates that Russian troops were directly involved in assisting the Iraqi military and intelligence services to secure and move the arms.

Documents reviewed by one defense official include specific Russian military unit itineraries for the truck convoys.

The arms that were taken out of the country included missile parts, nuclear-related equipment, tank and aircraft parts, and chemicals used in making poison gas weapons, the official said.

Regarding the satellite photographs, defense officials said the photographs bolster the information obtained from the European intelligence services on the Russian arms-removal program.

The Russian special forces troops were housed at a computer center near the Russian Embassy in Baghdad and left the country shortly before the U.S. invasion was launched March 20, 2003.

Harold Hough, a satellite photographic specialist, said commercial satellite images taken shortly before U.S. forces reached Baghdad revealed Russian transport aircraft at Baghdad's international airport near a warehouse.

"My thought was that the Russians were eager to get something out of Iraq quickly," Mr. Hough said. "But it is quite possible that the aircraft was used to transport the Russian forces."

Also yesterday, the IAEA said it warned the United States about the vulnerability of explosives stored at Al-Qaqaa after Iraq's Tuwaitha nuclear complex was looted.

"After we heard reports of looting at the Tuwaitha site in April 2003, the agency's chief Iraq inspectors alerted American officials that we were concerned about the security of the high explosives stored at Al-Qaqaa," IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming told the Associated Press.

She did not say which officials were notified or exactly when.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20041028-115519-3700r.htm>

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Pg. 10

Showdown Over Nuclear Plans Awaits Election Winner

By Robin Wright, Washington Post Staff Writer

For all the focus on foreign policy in this campaign, neither presidential candidate has spent much time explaining what may loom as the largest new challenge after Tuesday: what to do about Iran.

The United States faces a major test with Tehran over its nuclear program just three weeks after the U.S. election. Yet neither candidate has addressed the growing prospects that diplomacy may not work, that the world may be too divided to agree on punitive sanctions, and that military options, after Iraq, could spark major new domestic and international controversy.

And short of a new deal with Iran, a new president could face a showdown at the United Nations about the time of the inauguration in January, foreign policy analysts warn.

In the campaign, President Bush and Democratic candidate John F. Kerry have vowed to prevent Iran from converting its peaceful energy program into a nuclear weapons program. Beyond that, the difference between their positions is more subtle than substantive. Each has issued ultimatums and pressed for diplomacy.

Unable to issue a formal policy for four years because of internal divisions in his administration, Bush has long maintained a confrontational stance on Iran, a country he has called one of three in the "axis of evil." Only reluctantly has he recently agreed to let European leaders offer Iran a compromise to end the standoff. The deadline for an answer is Nov. 25, the next meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

But the Bush administration has already concluded that Iran will not accept the deal -- to scrap its own uranium enrichment in exchange for nuclear technology and fuel controlled by the outside world -- forcing the United States to press for international action at the United Nations.

"We believe that the Iranians are going to have to be referred to the Security Council because, when they refuse to live up to their obligations, that is the course that is prescribed," national security adviser Condoleezza Rice told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee on Monday.

In the second debate, Kerry pledged to "lead the world in the greatest counterproliferation effort. And if we have to get tough with Iran, believe me, we will get tough."

In a slight variation from Bush, Kerry earlier said that the United States, rather than Britain, France and Germany, should have initiated negotiations to curb Iran's nuclear potential. "I believe we could have done better. I think the United States should have offered the opportunity to provide the nuclear fuel, test them, see whether or not they were actually looking for it for peaceful purposes. If they weren't willing to work a deal, then we could have put sanctions together," he said in the first debate.

Kerry foreign policy adviser Richard C. Holbrooke, a former U.N. ambassador, told the AIPAC conference this week that the current European initiative is "self-evidently not going to ever succeed. And anyone who's worked with the Europeans knows this."

The Iran nuclear issue looms as the next big foreign policy challenge because it is "a crucial test of whether it is possible, by means short of the use of military force, to prevent a resourceful and determined country from acquiring nuclear weapons," said Robert J. Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

But whoever wins the election is likely to quickly face problems, foreign policy analysts warn. Unless a last-minute deal emerges, they say the United States will have to do serious arm-twisting to get the minimum number of votes at the IAEA to refer Iran to the United Nations.

Iran has become a symbol for a growing number of developing nations, such as Brazil, that want nuclear energy -- and control over their own fuel-production cycles without international intervention. Many Third World countries sympathize with Tehran's position that it will never permanently surrender the right to enrich uranium for nuclear energy, which the United States agrees is not illegal under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Neither candidate has developed a detailed strategy on this broader aspect of proliferation, which Washington could be dealing with for decades in many countries, foreign policy analysts say. Unless Washington outlines a policy that applies globally, they add, an agreement with Iran could prove elusive because Tehran leaders argue theirs is the only country being deprived of a legal right and a technology important for peaceful development in the 21st century.

But even if the United States does prevail at the IAEA, it could face a "high-stakes confrontation" against other veto-wielding members at the United Nations about the time of the inauguration, Einhorn said. Any drastic measure, such as an oil embargo, will also be "impossible," he added, because of shifting global economic realities and Iran's leverage. China buys 17 percent of its oil from Iran and European Union countries buy almost 7 percent, oil analysts say.

"Taking this to the Security Council is not going to solve much because it is unlikely to vote serious sanctions against Iran," said Shaul Bakhash, an Iran specialist at George Mason University and author of "The Reign of the Ayatollahs." "China depends on Iran for large amounts of oil and is eager to secure supplies for years to come, so it won't go along with sanctions."

The best the next president may initially achieve is U.N. pressure on Iran to be more cooperative with the IAEA, which analysts say would probably have minimal impact on Tehran.

Staff writer Glenn Kessler contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7434-2004Oct28.html>

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